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Energy Contract Planning: Allocating the
Risks and Consequences of Commercial
Impracticability
By NORMAN R. PRANCE*
B.A., Duke, 1967; J., isconsin, 1972; Assistant Professor, lVestern New
England College School of Law
I. INTRODUCTION
No topic is more appropriate to a discussion of North American
energy, and the relevant contract law, than that of commercial imprac-
ticability.' Simply stated, this body of law addresses those situations in
which performance of contract obligations is rendered impossible or
prohibitively difficult by contingencies not planned for.2 In practice,
commercial impracticability is routinely pleaded by suppliers as ajusti-
* The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Mr. Andrew Rodau,
Class of 1981, Western New England College School of Law.
1. This phrase derives largely from the use of "impracticable" in Section 2-615 of the
Uniform Commercial Code [U.C.C.]. All citations are to the 1972 official text.
2. Specifically, § 2-615 of the U.C.C. provides:
§ 2-615. Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject to
the preceding section on substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who complies
with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his duty under a contract for
sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence
of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on
which the contract was made or by compliance in good faith with any appli-
cable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it
later proves to be invalid.
(b) Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only a part of the seller's
capacity to perform, he must allocate production and deliveries among his
customers but may at his option include regular customers not then under
contract as well as his own requirements for further manufacture. He may so
allocate in any manner which is fair and reasonable.
(c) The seller must notify the buyer seasonably that there will be delay or non-
delivery and, when allocation is required under paragraph (b), of the esti-
mated quota thus made available for the buyer.
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fication for inability to supply and as a defense to claims of breach?
Americans are now subject to one shortage after another, whether
real or imagined, and none receive greater attention than the shortages
of energy which occur or are threatened from time to time. Because
many of our energy sources are in limited supply, and because these
sources are subject to disruption, it is essential that contract law, or at
least the contracts between energy suppliers and consumers, deal with
such disruptions and make clear their impact on the parties' obliga-
tions.4 At present the law provides neither adequately nor clearly for
such disruptions and does little to resolve the substantial number of
questions which they raise. Accordingly, where the supplier-consumer
relationship is governed by contract, the parties should agree between
themselves on the rules to govern their relationship when contingencies
prevent performance as planned.5
The purpose of this article is to assist in structuring such a con-
tract. The article commences with a brief discussion of the applicable
law, its various shortcomings, and the controversy which attends it at
least in part. Although the present law may well be intended as a bold
departure from the past, it has not been so interpreted by the courts or
the commentators; thus the protection which it provides the parties to a
contract in the fact situations which it is intended to address is scanty
indeed.
The article continues by addressing the extent to which the parties
to a contract are permitted to enlarge upon or supplant the provisions
of the applicable law. Finally, the article suggests ways in which the
contract drafter may attempt to overcome shortcomings in the applica-
ble law through contract planning.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") has been
3. The most prominent case to date involves litigation by several public utilities
against Westinghouse alleging breach of contractual obligations to deliver uranium, See In
re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 405 F. Supp. 316 (J.PMDL.
1975); Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, The Uranium Market and the Westinghouse Case,
J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 119 (1976). See Wall St. J., Nov. 3, 1975, at 10, col. 3.
4. Note that the "disruption" may take the form of decreased availability, higher
prices, or both.
5. Implicit here is the assumption that the parties are free to negotiate contract terms.
To the extent the terms and conditions of supply are dictated by, e.g., the government, these
suggestions are not applicable.
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adopted in the Virgin Islands, the District of Columbia and every state
in the United States except Louisiana.6 Section 2-102 states that "this
Article applies to transactions in goods .... " Section 2-105 provides
that "goods" means "all things (including specially manufactured
goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract
for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, invest-
ment securities (Article 8) and things in action." The case law estab-
lishes that most fuels constitute "goods" for purposes of Section 2-105
including crude oil,7 gasoline,' fuel oil,9 propane gas,10 natural gas,"
and jet fuel.'2 As to energy itself, specifically electricity, the cases go
both ways. 13 The argument against including electricity within the
scope of Section 2-105 is weak indeed if one takes into account the
concept of moveability and the general statement contained in Section
1-102(1) that "this act shall be liberally construed and applied to pro-
mote its underlying purposes and policies." These arguments would
also militate strongly in favor of including coal among the items cov-
ered, although no such decision has as yet been rendered. Bearing in
mind also the power of courts to apply the UCC by analogy, 4 this
article will proceed on the assumption that transactions in energy and
fuels are governed by the UCC, either directly or by analogy. 15
Section 1-105(1) provides as follows:
Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears
a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation
the parties may agree that the law either of this state or of such other
state or nation shall govern their rights and duties. Failing such ag-
greement this Act applies to transactions bearing an appropriate rela-
tion to this state.
6. See 1 UNIFORM LAWS Aieuo. (Master ed.) (UNIFoMI COMMERCIAL CODE), 1.
7. Amoco Pipeline Co. v. Admiral Crude Oil Corp. v. Tulsa Crude Oil Purchasing
Co., 490 F.2d 1'14 (10th Cir. 1974).
8. Oskey Gasoline & Oil Co., Inc. v. OKC Refining, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 1137, 1141 n.2
(D. Minn. 1973).
9. id
10. Mansfield Propane Gas Co., v. Folger Gas Co., 231 Ga. 868, 204 S.E.2d 625 (1974).
11. See Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1964).
12. See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Co., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
13. Compare Helvey v. Wabash County REMC, 151 Ind. App. 176, 179, 278 N.E.2d
608, 610 (1972) (electricity included) with Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison
Co., 38 Mich. App. 325, 328, 196 N.W.2d 316, 317 (1972) (sale of electricity a "service"
beyond scope of Article 2).
14. The most prominent instance of such application is United States v. Wegernatic
Corp., 360 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1966).
15. In most cases energy is marketed either as fuel or as electricity. Even where that is
not so, the argument for application of the U.C.C. by analogy is persuasive.
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Accordingly, the UCC will apply to transactions bearing an appropri-
ate relation to any of the 51 adopting jurisdictions and to such other
transactions where its applicability is stipulated by the parties, subject
to the necessary jurisdictional requirements.'
6
B. Section 2-615
The provisions of Article 2 which speak most directly to the issues
here under discussion are Sections 2-613, 2-614, 2-615 and 2-616 (and,
in Mississippi only, 2-617). This article deals primarily with Section 2-
615, which reads as follows:
§ 2-615. Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation
and subject to the preceding section on substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller
who complies with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his
duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been
made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-
occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the con-
tract was made or by compliance in good faith with any appli-
cable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order
whether or not it later proves to be invalid.
(b) Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only a part
of the seller's capacity to perform, he must allocate production
and deliveries among his customers but may at his option in-
clude regular customers not then under contract as well as his
own requirements for further manufacture. He may so allocate
in any manner which is fair and reasonable.
(c) The seller must notify the buyer seasonably that there will be
delay or non-delivery and, when allocation is required under
paragraph (b), of the estimated quota thus made available for
the buyer.
While Section 2-615 has been enacted in every jurisdiction in which
Article 2 has been adopted, and has been amended only in Missis-
sippi, 17 it has been the subject of relatively little litigation until recently.
Moreover, only since the Arab oil embargo of 1973 and the related
energy disruptions has Section 2-615 been the subject of significant
scholarly comment.' Previously, most critiques of Section 2-615 were
16. To the extent the court is guided by The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S.
1 (1972), the expressed intent of the parties should be given great weight.
17. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-615, -617.
18. Hawkland, The Energy Crisis and Section 2-615 ofthe Unform Commercial Code, 79
COM. L.J. 75 (1974); Hurst, Freedom of Contract in an Unstable Economy: Judlclal Realloca-
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merely part of larger articles dedicated to commenting on Article 2 as a
whole.19
Subsequent to 1973, however, the amount of litigation under Sec-
tion 2-615 has increased20 and the number of scholarly articles which
deal, or attempt to deal, with it is growing. Because it is not the pri-
mary purpose of this article to analyze in depth either the existing judi-
cial holdings, the current litigation or the various articles, I will at this
juncture attempt to summarize what the cases provide and what the
commentators have said.
Generally, the Section 2-615 cases require that before a seller3'
may invoke Section 2-615 the following requirements must be met:
first, a contingency must have occurred; second, this contingency must
make performance commercially impracticable (as defined); finally, the
non-occurrence of the contingency must have been a basic assumption
on which the contract was made. This test was enunciated in Transat-
lantic Financing Corp. v. United States" and has been reiterated by a
number of other courts.3
tion of ContractualRisks Under U.CC Section 2-615, 54 N.C.L. REV. 545 (1976); Schmitt &
Wellschlager, Section 2-615 "Commercial Impracticability'" Making the lmpracticable Prac-
ticable, 81 COM. LJ. 9 (1976); Note, The Doctrine of Inossibilitp of Performance and the
Foreseeability Test, 6 Loy. CHL LI., 575 (1975); Note, U. CC § 2-615. Sharp Inflationary
Increases in Cost as Excuse from Performance of Contract, 50 NoTRE DA.ME LAw. 297
(1974); Comment, Commercial Impracticability and Intent in U. CC Section 2-615" 4 Recon-
ciliation, 9 CONN. L. REv. 266 (1977); Comment, Contractual Excuse Based on a Failure of
Presupposed Conditions, 4 DUQ. L. REv. 235 (1976); Comment, Sections 2-615 and2-616 of
the Uniform Commercial Cod" Partial Solutions to the Problem of Excuse, 5 HOFSTRA L
REv. 167 (1976); Comment, Contractual Flexibility in a Volatile Econompr Saring U.CC.
Section 2-615from the Common Law, 72 N.W.U.L. REv. 1032 (1978); Comment, Unform
Commercial Code Section 2-615. Commercial InFracticabilityfrom the Buyer's Perspective,
51 TEMPLE L.Q. 518 (1978); Comment, The Energy Crisis and Economic lmpossibility, in Lou-
isiana Fuel.Requirements Contracts: A Gameplanfor Reform, 49 TUL. L REv. 605 (1975) (an
intriguing look at Louisiana law, not U.C.C. 2-615).
19. See, eg., Farnsworth, Omission in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 860 (1968); Gil-
bride, The Uniform Commercial Code" Impact on the Law of Contracts, 30 BROOKLYN L
REv. 177 (1964); Squillante, Sales Law in Iowa Under the U.CC Article 2, 20 DRAKE L
REv. 1 (1970).
20. To illustrate, albeit crudely: the hardbound Volume IA of the UNIFOIuit LAWS AN-
NOTATED lists 15 cases decided under U.C.C. § 2-615 as of August 1976. The accompany-
ing 1979 pocket part shows 22 cases decided in the last three years.
21. Note that Article 2 applies to all "transactions" in goods, and not only a purchase
and sale, U.C.C. § 2-102. In fact, however, the overwhelming majority of U.C.C. cases are
purchases and sales and not other transactions such as leases.
22. 363 F.2d 312, 315-16 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
23. Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 508 F.2d 283,293 (7th Cir. 1974);
Heat Exchangers, Inc. v. Map Construction Corp., 34 Md. App. 679, 684, 368 A.2d 1088,
1091 (1977); Olson v. Spitzer, 257 N.W.2d 459, 463 (S.D. 1977).
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A handful of cases have gone beyond this three part test to require
that the contingency rendering performance commercially impractica-
ble be either unforeseeable 4 or unforeseen 25 (a distinction which itself
has generated debate)26 and that the risk of such a contingency not
have been assumed by either party to the contract.27
A separate line of case authority is useful to explore the meaning
of "commercial impracticability" and to determine what contingencies
will satisfy Section 2-615.28 While the Official Comments to Section 2-
615 are helpful on both points, 29 they are not exhaustive and are not
intended to be,30 so there is ample room for judicial license.
The scholarly analyses of Section 2-615 and the relevant case law
have unearthed a number of difficulties. The first apparent problem is
that it is unclear whether Section 2-615 is intended merely to codify the
preexisting common law of "impossibility" and "frustration," or is in-
stead intended to be a broad and dramatic expansion of those doc-
trines.3 By and large the cases tend to analyze and apply Section 2-615
in the context of the common law and this may well be contrary to the
drafters' intent. Specifically, this approach appears to have been repu-
diated in the second sentence of Official Comment 3 which expressly
distinguishes "commercial impracticability" from "frustration" and
"impossibility."
The second question concerns the extent to which Section 2-615
requires the contingencies to be "unforeseen" or "unforeseeable."
Some authorities state that the test should be "unforeseen, ' 32 others
24. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 438 (S.D. Fla. 1975),
25. See generally Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957,
990 (5th Cir. 1976).
26. See notes 32-34 and accompanying text infra.
27. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir, 1976),
Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Eastern
Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975). At least arguably, tests
of foreseeability and assumption could be subsumed under the requirement that the non-
occurrence of the contingency has been a basic assumption on which the contract was made.
28. Terry v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 72 Cal. App. 3d 962, 140 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1977);
Mishara Construction Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., 365 Mass. 122, 3 10 N.E,2d 363
(1974); Olson v. Spitzer, 257 N.W.2d 459 (S.D. 1977). The cases in notes 23-27 are also
useful for this purpose.
29. See Official Comments 4 and 5 especially.
30. See Official Comment 2. While academicians delight in noting that the Official
Comments are not typically enacted into law, and thus can be questioned as authority, the
reality is that they are heavily relied on by bench and bar alike.
31. See Comment, Contractual Flexibility in a Volatile Economy: Saving U. C. C. Section
2-615 From the Common Law, 72 N.W. U. L. REV. 1032 (1978) and cases cited therein.
32. See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 990.
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maintain that it should be "unforeseeable," 33 and some argue that
neither test is appropriate.' The last position is clearly inapposite in
light of the specific reference to "unforeseen" in Official Comment 1.
This-reference would also militate against a standard of "foreseeabil-
ity." Certain cases which discuss Section 2-615 in "impossibility" and
"frustration" terms nonetheless cling to the "foreseeability" test.35
A third but vital consideration is that the courts typically have
found that the seller is not entitled to invoke Section 2-615 and that the
seller's obligation is not excused.16 While this head count is not con-
fined to energy contracts and is not, alone, appropriate to predict the
outcome of a given case, it is nonetheless telling evidence of judicial
hostility to claims of commercial impracticability.
I do not assert that Section 2-615 has been improperly adminis-
tered by the judiciary, or that scholarly comments about the statute and
the cases are wrong or right. What follows inexorably for the practi-
tioner concerned with the welfare of his client, however, is the conclu-
sion that Section 2-615 may well be inadequate in a given case to set
forth the parties' rights unambiguously and satisfactorily. Accordingly,
it is often in the parties' interests to enlarge upon or supplant the pro-
tection provided by Section 2-615.
33. See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 441.
34. See Comment, supra note 31, at 1033.
35. Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 318-19 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
36. The prominent cases make discouraging reading for seller's counsel. To be sure,
five of the cases have favored the seller Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1975); Intemar, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 364 F. Supp. 82
(E.D. Pa. 1973); Terry v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 72 Cal. App. 3d 962, 140 Cal. Rptr. 510
(1977); Mishara Const. Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Co., 365 Mass. 122, 310 N.E.2d 363
(1974); Olson v. Spitzer, 257 N.W.2d 459 (S.D. 1977). However, the following authorities
have found that a seller is entitled to no relief under Section 2-615: Bunge Corp. v. Recker,
519 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1975); Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 508 F.2d 283
(7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966); Transatlan-
tic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Iowa Electric Light & Power
Co. v. Atlas Corp. (N.D. Iowa), 23 U.C.C. Rep. 1171 (1978); Hancock Paper Co. v. Cham-
pion International Corp., 424 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Eastern Air Lines v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Bunge Corp. v. Miller, 381 F. Supp. 176 (W.D.
Tenn. 1974); Ralston-Purina Co. v. McNabb, 381 F. Supp. 181 (W.D. Ten. 1974); Cheme-
tron Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975); S.C.A. Int'l Inc. v. Garfield
& Rosen, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 246 (D. Mass. 1971); Heat Exchangers, Inc. v. Map Construction
Co., 34 Md. App. 679, 368 A.2d 1088 (1977); Maple Farms, Inc. v. City School Dist. of
Elmira, 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1974); and Security Sewage Equipment Co. v.
McFerran, 14 Ohio St. 2d 251, 237 N.E.2d 898 (1968). This is not an exhaustive listing of
U.C.C. § 2-615 cases, but it does contain all of the major litigation. For a more complete
list, see Comment, Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-615. Commercial Impracticabliy
from the Buyer's Perspective, 51 TEmPLE L.Q. 518, 519 n.7 (1978).
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C. May Section 2-615 Be Amended or Supplanted?
Section 2-202(3) states a recurring theme of the UCC, especially
Article 2, that the effective provisions of the UCC "may be varied by
agreement, except as otherwise provided in this Act and except that the
obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed
by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement but the parties may by
agreement determine the standards by which the performance of such
obligations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly un-
reasonable."
One would certainly conclude from this language that the parties
are permitted to vary the scope of Section 2-615 either as to seller or as
to buyer. There exists language to the contrary, however, both in the
body of the statute itself and in the Official Comments. First, the intro-
ductory language to Section 2-615 provides "except so far as a seller
may have assumed a greater obligation... ." This raises the question
whether a seller may assume a "lesser" obligation. This doubt is un-
derscored by the sentence in Official Comment 8 to Section 2-615
which provides that "express agreement as to exemptions designed to
enlarge upon or supplant the provisions of this section are to be read in
the light of mercantile sense and reason, for this section itself sets up
the commercial standard for normal and reasonable interpretation and
provides a minimum beyond which agreement may not go."
The view that Section 2-615 is not subject to amendment by the
parties has been coolly received by commentators who have addressed
the subject. Professor Hawkland, in an insightful analysis of the statute
and its legislative history, has concluded that the intent of the introduc-
tory language of Section 2-615 was merely to overrule a prior case
38
which was considered to have an unfortunate precedential effect on the
applicable law prior to the adoption of Section 2-615. 39 Support for
Hawkland's view is implicit in the numerous cases which have held
that a party is excused pursuant to the contract "contingency" clause or
similar clause. That is, where such a clause gives the seller greater pro-
tection than would be available under Section 2-615, the courts' resort
to this clause as determinative of the rights and obligations of the par-
ties implies that the clause is enforceable and an appropriate source of
37. Emphasis supplied here and elsewhere in this article except as otherwise expressly
noted.
38. Madeirense Do Brasil, S.A. v. Stulman-Emrick Lumber Co., 147 F.2d 399 (2d Cir.
1945).
39. Hawkland, The Energy Crisis and Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 79
COM. L.J. 75 (1974).
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the rules governing the parties' relationship.40
Against this background it is not unreasonable to conclude that the
parties are free to enlarge upon or supplant Section 2-615, although the
prudent counselor would note in advising clients the danger that any
clause, no matter how well drafted, may not be permissible should a
restrictive view of Section 2-615 (and the parties' freedom to contract
away from it) be taken.
III. HOW TO IMPROVE ON SECTION 2-615--
PROPOSALS FOR CONTRACTUAL
PROVISIONS
Given the uncertainties attending Section 2-615, it will often be
imprudent for a practitioner to leave a client's fate in the hands of the
UCC. Rather, the prudent counselor should consider more adequate
contractual provisions to protect the parties' expectations in the event
of a contingency.
Of course, several important considerations beyond the scope of
this article affect the enforceability of any such contractual provisions.
In all cases, the UCC's prohibition against unconscionable behavior
(Section 2-302, adopted in all of the states which have adopted the
UCC except California) would affect a clause which reached too far
and put one party at too great an advantage. Similarly, those consider-
ations relevant to enforceability of any contract (e.g., fraud, duress, co-
ercion, and the like, all of which may be admitted and proved pursuant
to Section 1-103) should be considered in determining whether the lan-
guage suggested below is permissible. Another important considera-
tion, also beyond the scope "of this article, is whether or not the party
desiring the contract provisions suggested can persuade the other party
to agree. Finally, certain provisions may be required by governmental
authorities regardless of the parties' desires.
Subject to these important qualifications, considerations to take
into account in drafting contractual protection as well as, in rudimen-
tary form, the language which might be used to effect the desired ends
are set forth below. Needless to say, any suggested draft of language
40. For cases which either ascertain the parties' rights by reference to contractual stipu-
lations or suggest that such stipulations would be appropriate, see, etg., Eastern Air Lines v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 552 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976); T.V.A. v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 69 F.R.D. 5 (E.D. Tenn. 1975); Intemar, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 364 F. Supp.
82, 99 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Mansfield Propane Gas Co. v. Folger Gas. Co., 231 Ga. 868, 204
S.E.2d 625 (1974); Heat Exchangers, Inc. v. Map Construction Corp., 34 Md. App. 679, 368
A.2d 1088 (1977).
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should be amended as necessary to be consistent with language used
elsewhere in the agreement in which the clause is inserted. The lan-
guage suggested below assumes that the basic contractual provision
would read as follows:
Seller shall not be liable for nonperformance or delay in perform-
ance of any provision of this Contract if performance shall be pre-
vented by fire, strike, act of God or other event not reasonably within
its control. Where only part of Seller's capacity to perform is af-
fected, Seller shall fairly and reasonably allocate production and de-
liveries among his customers but may at his option include regular
customers not then under contract as well as his own requirements
for further manufacture.
A. Application to Buyer
The most prominent feature of Section 2-615 is that it applies by
its terms only to seller, and not to buyer. Section 2-615 nowhere speci-
fies the circumstances pursuant to which the buyer may be granted re-
lief in the event of failure of presupposed conditions. Although that
subject is addressed by Official Comment 9, which cross-refers to Sec-
tion 2-306, reliance by a buyer on such meager authority would be ill-
advised.4 Rather, the buyer should require express contractual cover-
age; this may be done by having the opening language of a "contin-
gency" clause read as follows:
"Neither party shall be liable for nonperformance or delay in per-
formance of any provision of this Contract...."
The rest of the clause would be similarly worded so that it clearly ap-
plies to both parties.
While a seller might reasonably acquiesce to the above proposal,
seller should nonetheless insist that in no event could a contingency
excuse buyer's obligation to pay. Accordingly, where the clause ex-
pressly protects the buyer, the seller may wish to include:
"Nothing herein contained shall relieve Buyer of the obligation to
pay in full for - delivered hereunder and all other amounts due by
Buyer to Seller under this Contract."
The one state in which the protection for buyer need not be ex-
41. Official Comment 9 was discussed in Nora Springs Cooperative Co. v. Brandau, 247
N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 1976) where the Iowa Supreme Court, in dicta, stated that the protection
of Section 2-615 extends to buyers. The court also suggested that Section 2-615 did not
completely abrogate common law doctrines of impossibility and frustration which might be
argued to supplement Section 2-615, for either party's benefit, under Section 1-103.
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pressly inserted (although the provision concerning failure to pay is still
desirable) is Mississippi which, through its special amendments to these
sections, has extended them to apply to buyers. 2
B. Specified Contingencies
It is not uncommon for drafters to list dozens of contingencies
which may excuse performance. Clauses typically start with fires, riots
and war, and the more exotic variations include "acts of God" and a
host of meteorological disturbances. The difficulty with any such list is
simply that it is not, and never will be, complete. While the drafter
may well have thought of every contingency which has occurred in his
experience, he cannot foresee every contingency which might affect the
contract in question and serve as a reasonable basis for excuse.
Therefore, if any contingencies at all are listed (as clients often
insist), the list should be accompanied with general language and
should be stated to be non-exhaustive. For example:
any event beyond the reasonable control of the party affected includ-
ing, but not limited to, the following: fire, war, etc.
Contingency clauses also often excuse performance to the extent it
is prevented by, e.g., "fires, acts of God, or other causes beyond the
control of party affected." The protection would be broadened if the
word "other" were removed. The effect of including "other" is that
none of the listed contingencies excuse performance unless they too are
beyond the party's control. While the contingency may usually be be-
yond the party's control the protection is enhanced and difficult
problems of proof are eliminated if the clause includes any acts beyond
the party's control and, in addition, any fire, strike, riot, or the like,
whether beyond the party's control or not. This might be done by re-
phrasing the list of contingencies set forth above to read as follows:
any event beyond the reasonable control of the party affected or any
fire, strike, riot, etc.
C. Acts of Government
It is common to include "acts of government" among those activi-
ties which constitute a defense to a breach of contract claim should they
prevent performance. As with any language, these words become
troublesome "around the edges" and can be improved upon.
When "acts of government" are specified it can be argued that the
42. MIss. CODE ANN. (1972) § 75-2-615.
No. 3]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
act in question was not taken by a "government." Consider an energy
supplier or consumer who argues that performance was made commer-
cially impracticable, within the last 18 months, by "acts of govern-
ment" in Iran or Nicaragua. The contract language could raise thorny
questions, better left unargued, concerning whether the regimes previ-
ously and presently in power in those countries constitute "govern-
ments" and, more difficult, at what point they became or ceased to be
"governments." Troublesome considerations of sovereignty, diplomatic
recognition and the like could come into play. These questions are best
avoided through careful contract planning. One way to avoid such a
problem is to excuse performance when it is prevented by an "act of a
government or person or persons purporting to act with government
authority." In my opinion this is more clear than the UCC's attempt to
address the situation in the last clause of Section 2-615(a) ("whether or
not it later proves to be invalid.").
The next question arises when the government action is not
mandatory but rather a "request" or "jawboning." What is the status
of such government action when the contract requires an "act?" Need-
less to say jawboning or requests may, as a practical matter, carry all
the weight of a law or regulation of public order under certain circum-
stances. For example, what if the United States government "requests"
that each oil supplier comply with voluntary allocation programs and,
further, makes known its intent to withdraw government contracts
from, and/or impose mandatory controls on, those who do not. These
considerations suggest that instead of "act" the contract clause use
broader language:
compliance, voluntary or involuntary, with a direction or request of
any government or person purporting to act with government author-
ity.
D. Strikes
While it is generally well recognized that a strike which prevents
performance may excuse contract obligations, it can be argued that no
strike prevents performance because the party affected may always ac-
quiesce to the demands of the strikers. This difficulty may be ad-
dressed by providing in "contingency" lists:
strike or other labor difficulty (whomsoever's employees are in-
volved), even though the strike or other labor difficulty could be set-
tled by acceding to the demands of a labor group.
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E. The Effect of "Prevention"
Most contingency clauses require that a contingency "prevent"
performance before the party's obligation is excused. This language
presents two potential problems for the energy supplier or consumer
(more likely the former). The first and most difficult arises where nu-
merous supply sources are possible; the second deals simply with the
narrowness of the word "prevent."
First, imagine a large energy supplier with numerous natural re-
source deposits and transportation facilities. If this supplier has a con-
tract to supply large quantities of energy to a given customer it may
well rely on only one of its energy sources and transportation sources to
service the customer. It is unlikely, however, that the supply chain ac-
tually in use will always be contractually specified, either because the
supplier wishes to retain the flexibility to change from time to time or
because nobody has thought to do so. It is even possible that the cus-
tomer will be unaware of the given source of supply from time to time.
Accordingly, when the supply chain actually used is disrupted, the
seller would have great difficulty claiming that it is now unable to sup-
ply and could not invoke the protection which the Official Comments
suggest should apply where the source is mutually agreed to. After all,
what is to stop the seller from using other energy sources, or purchasing
in the spot market?
A second shortcoming relates simply to the word "prevent" which
is narrow and probably gives the affected party even less protection
that the "impracticable" language of the UCC.
Suggested language to address these difficulties is:
Neither party shall be liable... if performance as then contemplated
by the affected party is prevented, restricted or delayed by ....
This clause might go one step further and permit seller to reduce
supplies to buyer when any portion of seller's world-wide supply was
disrupted. Indeed, such a provision might well reflect what in fact most
often occurs in a contingency. Of course, it would be desirable to have
such a clause in all of seller's contracts, and the seller would presuma-
bly wish to be certain that it was so highlighted that no claim could
later be made that the buyer was not aware of its existence.
F. Purchases During Periods of Cutback
A well-drafted clause will make two provisions on this subject.
First, it will provide (if the parties so intend) that seller is not obligated
to acquire products from other suppliers by purchase or otherwise dur-
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ing the periods that seller's own sources of supply for buyer are dis-
rupted. This is a further gloss on the basic protection provided to seller
under E, above. In addition, the clause will protect buyer by providing
that it is not a breach of contract for buyer to buy from other than seller
the quantities of energy which seller is unable to deliver to buyer in a
contingency period. This is especially important where the contract
covers buyer's requirements.
Suggested language is as follows:
So long as deliveries are reduced pursuant to this Section
Buyer may buy from other than Seller the quantities of
covered by this Contract which Seller does not deliver and any such
quantities so purchased shall be deducted from Buyer's purchase ob-
ligations hereunder.
In no event shall Seller be obligated to purchase from others the
quantity of necessary to deliver to Buyer full Contract
quantities hereunder.
G. Modification of Buyer's Procedure on Notice Claiming Excuse
Section 2-616 puts the buyer to a difficult choice once he has re-
ceived notice pursuant to Section 2-615 that deliveries will be curtailed.
Under Section 2-616 the buyer may, as to the delivery in question (and
in certain circumstances as to the whole contract) either terminate and
discharge any unexecuted portion of the contract or modify the con-
tract by agreeing to take his available quota in substitution. Section 2-
616(2) goes on to provide that the contract lapses with respect to any
deliveries affected, failing notification by buyer to seller of modifica-
tion. Section 2-616(3) bars modification of this section by agreement,
except insofar as the seller has assumed a greater obligation.43
The difficulty presented by Section 2-616 is that buyers are often
unaware of their obligation to notify the seller and, thus, may in-
advertantly allow the contract to lapse pursuant to subsection 2. More-
over, whether the seller's notice is permissible under Section 2-615 (that
is, whether that section applies) may be in dispute. Thus, while the
buyer may not believe that the seller is entitled under the circumstances
then obtaining to reduce deliveries, the buyer may nonetheless desire to
take whatever he can while saving for another day the dispute whether
any reduction at all is permitted.
To avoid this difficult choice, as well as the common problem that
the buyer fails to notify the seller at all, the buyer's attorney should, in
43. A number of states have made amendments to § 2-616.
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drafting a contract, seek to amend Section 2-616 in order to increase
the seller's obligation. This may be done by relieving the buyer of the
need to make the choices which Section 2-616 requires, and by provid-
ing further that if notification of a reduced delivery is given, the deliv-
ery shall automatically be sent unless buyer notifies seller to the
contrary. The contract should further require that any communications
by buyer to seller concerning such reduced delivery do not constitute a
waiver by buyer of the right subsequently to object to the invocation of
Section 2-615 or the applicable contract clause.' Suggested language
to achieve these purposes is as follows:
When Buyer receives notification of a material or indefinite delay in
delivery or an allocation, Buyer may by notice to Seller as ,to any
delivery concerned, and where the prospective deficiency substan-
tially impairs the value of the whole Contract, then also as to the
whole,
terminate and thereby discharge any unexecuted portion of the
Contract; or
agree to take any available quota.
If after receipt of such notice from Seller, Buyer does not respond
within days, Buyer shall be deemed to have agreed to
take any available quota.
Any such action taken or deemed taken by Buyer shall be without
prejudice to any other right or remedy of Buyer.
H. Makeup
Depending on the form of energy covered by the contract, and the
uses to which it is to be put, makeup may be quite important. Assume,
for example, a contract between a coal company and a utility for vast
quantities of coal over a long time period for the utility to burn at its
power-generating station. Imagine further that the utility maintains a
90 day reserve supply of coal on its premises. The fact that the coal
company is unable in a given month, due to a contingency, to fulfill its
44. None of these suggestions have to be effected by prior contract planning. That is,
appropriate notifications could be sent at the time that the notice of quota is received, which
would have the same effect. The value, however, of providing in the contract the meaning of
the parties' communications is that the buyer is protected in the not unlikely event that there
may be substantial communication between buyer and seller without benefit of counsel at
the time the shortages are originally notified to buyer, and important waivers may have
taken place by the time the lawyer for the buyer is first made aware of the developments. Of
course, contractual protection may also be waived, so that there are limits to the attorney's
ability to insulate his client from unwittingly surrendering valuable rights.
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delivery obligations would presumably not affect the utility's desire
that the coal company make up the deliveries at a later date.
In contrast, consider the case of the oil company which supplies jet
fuel to an airline, delivered into-plane, for flights which the airline
makes from a given airport. If delivery cannot be made as scheduled, it
it perhaps less likely that makeup in the future will be helpful to the
airline.
Two lessons flow from these illustrations. First, because assump-
tions are undesirable and the parties' intentions may not otherwise be
clear, it should be contractually specified whether or not deliveries
which are excused in one period must be made up in the next (or at
such time as they can be made up). One method of providing for
makeup is for the parties to extend the life of the contract by the period
of time (assuming the same delivery rate) for which contract deliveries
were suspended due to a contingency.
Equally important is to specify the price at which makeup shall
occur. If deliveries in one period are excused, but can be made up
three months hence, what will be the price of the makeup supply if
there has been an increase in the contract price in the meantime? No
issue is more critical in times of supply shortages and price increases,
and the matter is far too complicated, and potentially expensive, to be
left to ad hoc determination after the dispute has arisen. Language
which would satisfactorily achieve these various results is set forth be-
low:
No Makeup
If deliveries are suspended or reduced pursuant to this Section
-, Seller shall not be obligated to sell and Buyer shall not be obli-
gated to buy, after such suspension or reduction, the undelivered
quantity of which normally would have been delivered
hereunder during the period of suspension or reduction.
Makeup
If deliveries are suspended or reduced pursuant to this Section
-, the period of this Contract shall be extended for such time as is
necessary for such deliveries to be fully made up. The price, rate of
delivery and other terms and conditions of supply during such exten-
sion period shall be identical to those in effect in the period [insert,
e.g., the last six months of the contract prior to extension, or some
other appropriate period.]
(Vol. 3
Commercial Impracticability And Energy Contracts
I. Termination
The party not invoking the contingency clause should be able to
terminate the contract after performance has been suspended for a cer-
tain period of time. If it cannot, that party is left forever dependent on
a partner whose ability to perform is in doubt. An appropriate clause
would be as follows:
If performance is suspended by either party under this Section
- for more than consecutive days, the other party
may while such suspension continues give notice of termination of
this Contract to such party, termination to be effective 30 days after
receipt of such notice.
J. Summary of Changes
Set forth below is a contingency clause which incorporates all of
the suggestions which have been discussed above.
Contingencies
Neither party shall be liable for nonperformance or delay in per-
formance of any provision of this Contract if performance as then
contemplated by the affected party is prevented, restricted or delayed
by:
any event beyond the reasonable control of the party affected; or
a strike, or other labor difficulty (whomsoever's employees are
involved), even though the strike could be settled by acceding to
the demands of a labor group; or
compliance, voluntary or involuntary, with a direction or re-
quest of any government or person purporting to act with gov-
ernment authority;, or
any fire, riot, war or act of God (here list any other contingen-
cies specifically desired).
The affected party must immediately notify the other party of any
such nonperformance or delay in performance.
Where only part of Seller's capacity to perform is affected, Seller
shall fairly and reasonably allocate production and deliveries among
its customers but may at its option include regular customers not
then under contract as well as its own requirements for further man-
ufacture.45
When Buyer receives notification of a material or indefinite delay in
45. No attempt is made to improve upon the allocation language of § 2-615. It is fair
and reasonable, it is consistent with sellers' usual practice, anyway and, in this author's
experience, purchasers are unlikely to agree to change it. Official Comment 11 notes that
"this section seeks to leave every reasonabe business leeway to the seller."
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delivery or an allocation, Buyer may by notice to Seller as to any
delivery concerned, and where the prospective deficiency substan-
tially impairs the value of the whole contract, then also as to the
whole,
terminate and thereby discharge any unexecuted portion of the
Contract; or
agree to take any available quota.
If after receipt of such notice from Seller, Buyer does not respond
within - days, Buyer shall be deemed to have agreed to take any
available quota. Any such action taken or deemed taken by Buyer
shall be without prejudice to any other right or remedy of Buyer.
In no event shall Seller be obligated to purchase from others the
quantity of - necessary to deliver to Buyer full Contract quan-
tities hereunder.
If deliveries are suspended or reduced pursuant to this Section
- the period of this Contract shall be extended for such period as is
necessary for such deliveries to be fully made up. The price, rate of
delivery and other terms and conditions of supply during such exten-
sion period shall be identical to those in effect in the period [insert
e.g., the last six months of the Contract prior to extension.]
So long as deliveries are reduced pursuant to this Section
Buyer may buy from other than Seller the quantities of - cov-
ered by this Contract which Seller does not deliver and any such
quantities so purchased shall be deducted from Buyer's purchase ob-
ligations hereunder.
If performance is suspended by either party under this Section
- for more than - consecutive days, the other party may while
such suspension continues give notice of termination of this Contract
to such party, termination to be effective 30 days after receipt of such
notice.
Nothing herein contained shall relieve Buyer of the obligation to pay
in full for delivered hereunder and all other amounts
due by Buyer to Seller under this Contract.46
IV. CONCLUSION
While Section 2-615 of the UCC may have been intended as a
major improvement in terms of c6verage, clarity and simplicity in the
law of commercial impracticability, its meaning and scope are not to-
46. Buyer may wish to add a provision to the effect that seller shall remedy any contin-
gency situation with due diligence and take on no new business for such period as deliveries
to buyer are curtailed due to a contingency. These provisions are not included here because
I believe they are implicit in the notion that seller's performance is excused only to the extent
permitted by the clause.
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tally clear. Perhaps for that reason Section 2-615 has received only
halting acceptance by the courts. Because the meaning of Section 2-615
is unclear, and because the courts have allowed it to provide only very
limited relief, there is a clear message to contract drafters representing
both buyers and sellers alike, particularly the latter: the protection of
Section 2-615 should be supplemented with careful contract planning.
The consequences of disruptions of supplies and price increases are
simply too substantial to leave to judicial discretion where they could
have been provided for, instead, by the parties in advance.
Of course, any attempt by the parties so to provide is subject to
important caveats concerning the enforceability of any contract. This
is particularly true in circumstances where the parties are of unequal
bargaining power. Conversely, where both parties possess business
acumen and bargaining power, and both have access to counsel, there
is little reason why the clauses suggested here should not be entirely
enforceable with no judicial hesitation.

